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Abstract 
Despite a very effective vaccine, active conflict and community distrust during the 
ongoing DRC Ebola epidemic are undermining control efforts, including a ring 
vaccination strategy that requires the prompt immunization of close contacts of 
infected individuals. However, in April 2019, it was reported 20% or more of close 
contacts cannot be reached or refuse vaccination [1], and it is predicted that the ring 
vaccination strategy would not be effective with such a high level of inaccessibility [2]. 
The vaccination strategy is now incorporating a “third ring” community-level 
vaccination that targets members of communities even if they are not known contacts 
of Ebola cases. To assess the impact of vaccination strategies for controlling Ebola 
epidemics in the context of variable levels of community accessibility, we employed an 
individual-level stochastic transmission model that incorporates four sources of 
heterogeneity: a proportion of the population is inaccessible for contact tracing and 
vaccination due to lack of confidence in interventions or geographic inaccessibility, two 
levels of population mixing resembling household and community transmission, two 
types of vaccine doses with different time periods until immunity, and transmission 
rates that depend on spatial distance. Our results indicate that a ring vaccination 
strategy alone would not be effective for containing the epidemic in the context of 
significant delays to vaccinating contacts even for low levels of household 
inaccessibility and affirm the positive impact of a supplemental community vaccination 
strategy. Our key results are that as levels of inaccessibility increase, there is a 
qualitative change in the effectiveness of the vaccination strategy. For higher levels of 
vaccine access, the probability that the epidemic will end steadily increases over time, 
even if probabilities are lower than they would be otherwise with full community 
participation. For levels of vaccine access that are too low, however, the vaccination 
strategies are not expected to be successful in ending the epidemic even though they 
help lower incidence levels, which saves lives, and makes the epidemic easier to 
contain and reduces spread to other communities. This qualitative change occurs for 
both types of vaccination strategies: ring vaccination is effective for containing an 
outbreak until the levels of inaccessibility exceeds approximately 10% in the context of 
significant delays to vaccinating contacts, a combined ring and community vaccination 
strategy is effective until the levels of inaccessibility exceeds approximately 50%. More 
broadly, our results underscore the need to enhance community engagement to public 
health interventions in order to enhance the effectiveness of control interventions to 
ensure outbreak containment. 
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Author summary 
 
In the context of the ongoing Ebola epidemic in DRC, active conflict and community 
distrust are undermining control efforts, including vaccination strategies. In this paper, 
we employed an individual-level stochastic structured transmission model to assess 
the impact of vaccination strategies on epidemic control in the context of variable 
levels of household inaccessibility. We found that a ring vaccination strategy of close 
contacts would not be effective for containing the epidemic in the context of 
significant delays to vaccinating contacts even for low levels of household 
inaccessibility and evaluate the impact of a supplemental community vaccination 
strategy. For lower levels of inaccessibility, the probability of epidemic containment 
increases over time. For higher levels of inaccessibility, even the combined ring and 
community vaccination strategies are not expected to contain the epidemic even 
though they help lower incidence levels, which saves lives, makes the epidemic easier 
to contain and reduces spread to other communities. We found that ring vaccination is 
effective for containing an outbreak until the levels of inaccessibility exceeds 
approximately 10%, a combined ring and community vaccination strategy is effective 
until the levels of inaccessibility exceeds approximately 50%. Our findings underscore 
the need to enhance community engagement to public health interventions. 
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Introduction 
The ongoing Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has 
been active in the region for over a year (August 2018 to August 2019), has become 
the most complex Ebola epidemic to date, threatening to spread to neighboring 
countries.  Active case finding and contact tracing activities played a major role in 
controlling the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic, which devastated communities in West 
Africa with a total of >28,000 cases and >11,000 deaths reported in the three most 
affected countries, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone [3]. Although contact tracing is a 
critical piece of a response to Ebola outbreaks, its effectiveness varied over time across 
all three of the most affected countries [4-6]. Factors that hampered the effectiveness 
of contact tracing during the West African epidemic included geographic inaccessibility 
and socio-cultural challenges such as mistrust of healthcare workers and community 
resistance to case investigation and contact tracers [6-8]. 
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The unprecedented epidemic in DRC is unfolding in a climate of community distrust in 
the interventions [9, 10] in an active conflict zone [11], where over 200 attacks have 
deliberately targeted healthcare workers and treatment centers involved in the Ebola 
response efforts, allowing sustained transmission in the region. Consequently, the DRC 
Ebola epidemic has accumulated 2763 cases including 1841 deaths as of August 4, 
2019 and has reached the urban city of Goma [12] and spilled over to Uganda where 3 
cases have been confirmed as of June 12, 2019 [13, 14]. A surge in case incidence 
during the last few months (April-August, 2019) has coincided with an increasing trend 
in the number of violent attacks on health centers and health teams fighting the 
epidemic in the region [15]. 
 
Although control efforts now employ a highly effective emergency vaccine, the 
ongoing Ebola epidemic in the DRC is the first to occur in an active conflict zone. 
Deliberate violent attacks and threats to health workers on a scale not seen in previous 
Ebola outbreaks are directly undermining active control efforts in the region [11].  A 
ring vaccination strategy [16, 17] that was highly effective in the capital [18] was 
introduced rapidly on August 8th, 2018 within 8 days of the outbreak declaration in the 
provinces of North Kivu and Ituri [19]. However, it has been challenging to implement 
an effective ring vaccination strategy in a climate of violence targeting healthcare 
workers and decreasing accessibility to a mobile, fractionated population as it relies on 
the identification of contacts and contacts of contacts [20]. This issue is compounded 
by a large fraction of Ebola cases unconnected to known chains of transmission [21]. In 
order to boost the impact of the vaccine in a challenging transmission setting with a 
large fraction of hidden or underground transmission, the vaccination strategy is now 
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incorporating vaccination of third level contacts [22-24] (also known as “third ring” or 
“ring +” vaccination). This is a community-level vaccination because the third ring 
strategy will immunize members of communities even if they are not known contacts 
of Ebola cases[24] and increases the number of contacts vaccinated from as many as 
120 to 210 [25]. Also being considered is using a lower vaccine dose for the third ring 
vaccination, which will take longer to elicit protective antibody levels in vaccinated 
individuals [22, 23].  
 
For simplicity, the effects of suboptimal control interventions including contact tracing 
and vaccination at the household level can be investigated using a structured 
individual-level model consisting of two spatial scales: households and overlapping 
communities [26, 27]. Households are then categorized in two types: accessible and 
inaccessible households whereby individuals in inaccessible households do not provide 
contacts lists to contact tracing teams, which hinders the effectiveness of contact 
tracing efforts, and do not participate in vaccination. This lack of participation in 
contact tracing may be due to a range of factors including health care inaccessibility, 
and furthermore, vaccination refusal may occur when contacts have religious beliefs 
that do not permit them to take the Ebola vaccine, they may think they do not need it 
or they may not believe in Ebola [24, 28]. 
 
Here we sought to evaluate the impact of ongoing Ebola vaccination campaigns by 
extending an individual-based model with household-community mixing  [26, 27], 
which has been previously used to analyze the effects of  lower versus higher rates of 
population mixing on Ebola transmission dynamics. This model has been able to fit the 
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growth patterns of the 2014-16 Western Africa Ebola epidemic (e.g., the growth 
pattern of the epidemic in Guinea, versus Sierra Leone or Liberia) by calibrating the 
extent of community mixing [26]. This structured transmission model predicts 
outbreaks that propagate through the population as spatial waves with an endemic 
state [27] and has been useful to gain insight on the level of control that would be 
required to contain Ebola epidemics [27]. One of the less intuitive results of the 
community model was that even a low daily incidence can indicate an epidemic that is 
difficult to extinguish if saturation effects decrease incidence and are masking  a higher 
reproductive number. Saturation effects occur when contacts of infectious individuals 
are already infected by other members of the community, such as family members or 
members of other close groups, and decrease the incidence when community mixing is 
low. 
 
Assessing the effect of targeted vaccination efforts requires mathematical models that 
capture the contact structure of the community network [29-33].  In our paper, we 
aimed to investigate the effect of ring [29, 31, 34-36] and community vaccination 
strategies on outbreak control. For this purpose, our baseline stochastic model, which 
has been calibrated using data for the Western African Ebola epidemic[26, 27], was 
adapted to incorporate key features of the Ebola epidemic in the DRC. Specifically, 
epidemiological and transmission parameters, such as the incubation and infectious 
periods, and the household and community reproductive numbers, were based on the 
West African Ebola epidemic in general. The community size, which corresponds to the 
connectivity of the contact network, was based on data from the Liberian epidemic for 
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the structure of a contact network in an urban setting.1 This baseline model was 
adapted for two different programs of vaccination and two types of vaccine doses, a 
variable fraction of the population that is accessible and distance-dependent 
transmission rates.  With the updated model, we evaluate the effectiveness of control 
strategies in the context of a fraction of the population that is accessible to vaccination 
teams, tied to the success of contact tracing and vaccination efforts. Our baseline 
network transmission model also adapts for the ring vaccination strategy by 
integrating heterogeneity in community transmission rates that scale with the distance 
between an infectious individual and each member of that individual’s community.  As 
the distance between an infectious individual and a contact increases, the transmission 
rate decreases exponentially (or by any other function). Ring and community 
vaccination strategies are compared by accounting for the two different spatial scales 
for the radius of contacts that are vaccinated (either as a ring or community-wide) and 
the two different vaccine doses (a full or half dose), that result in different time 
periods for the immunization of vaccinated contacts. 
 
                                                     
1
 Previously, the different growth profiles of the Ebola Virus epidemics in Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia were matched by varying the network structure (community size C) rather than modifying 
intrinsic transmission rates 26. Kiskowski M. Three-Scale Network Model for the Early Growth 
Dynamics of 2014 West Africa Ebola Epidemic. . PLOS Currents Outbreaks. 2014;doi: 
10.1371/currents.outbreaks.b4690859d91684da963dc40e00f3da81. doi: doi: 
10.1371/currents.outbreaks.c6efe8274dc55274f05cbcb62bbe6070, 27. Kiskowski M, Chowell G. 
Modeling household and community transmission of Ebola virus disease: epidemic growth, spatial 
dynamics and insights for epidemic control. Virulence. 2015;7(2):63-73. doi: doi: 
10.1080/21505594.2015.1076613. PubMed PMID: 26399855. 
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Methods 
 
Household-Community Model for Ebola Spread and Two Types of Vaccination with 
Accessible and Inaccessible Households 
We previously described our model for disease spread [26, 27] and vaccination [37] in 
a contact network with household-community structure. A new component of our 
model is that we add a second type of household that is inaccessible to vaccination 
teams. These households may not participate for a variety of reasons including Ebola 
cases that are not identified, lack of confidence in the vaccination program and 
geographic inaccessibility. The inaccessible households do not participate in 
vaccination and do not provide contacts lists. We also modify the model to include two 
vaccine types. A larger vaccine dose is used for ring vaccination with faster 
immunization occurring 10 days later, and a smaller vaccine dose is used for 
community vaccination with immunization occurring 28 days later. This corresponds to 
the dosing and predicted timing of the ring and community vaccination regimens of 0.5 
ml and 0.2 ml doses, respectively, recently described for the DRC Ebola epidemic [20, 
22].  
 
Disease and Vaccination States 
The progression of Ebola disease, vaccination and immunization are modeled with 
seven epidemiological states (S, E, I, R, Svr, Svc, M); including four SEIR states for Ebola 
disease progression (susceptible S, exposed E, infectious I and refractory R) and three 
states for vaccination progression (two susceptible but vaccinated states SVR and SVC 
and an immune state M) (see Figure 1). The states Svc and Svr are assigned to 
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individuals vaccinated by community or ring vaccination.  Individuals with these states 
remain susceptible to Ebola exposure. After a delay of 10 days for Svr states or 28 days 
for Svc states, the individuals become immune by transitioning to state M.  
Individuals in three epidemiological states (S, Svc and Svr) are at risk of contracting 
Ebola from infectious individuals (I), and transitioning to the latent period (exposed 
state E). Transition rates from any of these three susceptible states to the exposed 
state depend on the contact network and increase with the number of infectious 
contacts. That is, if the rate of exposure per infectious contact is t then the rate of 
exposure will be 𝑚 ∗ 𝑡  for a susceptible individual with m infectious contacts.  In our 
model, individuals in the exposed state E (latency) are no longer available for effective 
vaccination and immunization. Thus, if an individual is indicated to be vaccinated by 
either the ring or community vaccination programs, they may be approached by a 
vaccination team and given the vaccine since their exposure status is unknown, but 
once in the exposed class, they may not change states to the susceptible states Svc or 
Svr. Once exposed, nodes transition from the exposed (E) to infectious class (I) with 
probability 
1
𝛾
 per day where 𝛾 = 9 days is the average incubation period [38-42] and 
once infectious, nodes transition from the infectious (I) to refractory class (R) with 
probability 
1
𝜆
 per day, where 𝜆 = 5.6 days is the average infectious period [38-41].  
Parameter definitions and values used in simulations and their sources are given in 
Table 1. 
 
 
Contact Network with Household and Community Structure 
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As in  refs. [26, 27, 37], we model the spread of Ebola on a contact network that 
consists of households of size H that are organized in communities of size C 
households. Households are arranged  as a continuous line of households within an 
LxH grid where L is the number of households in the total contact network N. 
Households are indexed by their position in the line {ℎ𝑖, ℎ𝑖+1, … } and a network 
distance η between two households hi and hj is defined as the number of households 
separating them (η=|i-j|).  Each household has its own “community” that overlaps with 
the communities of other nearby households. In particular, the ith community is 
centered at the ith household and includes all of the households within a radius  of the 
ith household (for a community containing C households, the community radius is 
Rc=(C-1)/2)).  This contact network is highly mutually connected, the extent of overlap 
between the ith and jth communities depend on the network distance of the ith and jth 
households in that communities of nearby households overlap and share most 
households. Due to this high mutual connectivity and linear arrangement of the 
contact network, saturation effects build up quickly and disease progresses spatially as 
1-dimensional wave through the lattice network. The size of the contact network and 
the size of the simulated population is unlimited since the lattice size LxH is dynamic 
and extends as needed as the disease and immunity extends through the population 
by adding households to the ends of the array. 
 
In this version of the model, each household is designated as accessible or inaccessible 
as illustrated in Figure 2. This assignment is random when the household is created 
and once a household is labeled, this assignment does not change. During the initial 
construction of the contact network, and as the array is dynamically extended, 
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households are labeled inaccessible with probability β, otherwise the household is 
accessible. Here we compare results as a function of the fraction of inaccessible 
households between 0 and 50%.  (This range includes the estimate of 30% non-
participating individuals that was estimated for a vaccination program when it is 
expanded to younger age groups in [43]; and indeed the program was approved for 
expansion to younger age groups in the first half of 2019 [44, 45]. This range also 
includes estimates of 25% for the number of cases that are missed for the ongoing DRC 
epidemic[46]. 
 
Distance Dependent Transmission Rates 
At the onset of an epidemic, before the accumulation of saturation effects when all 
nodes of the network are susceptible except for a single infectious case, the household 
reproductive number R0H is the average number of secondary infections within the 
household of the infected individual and the community reproductive number R0C is 
the average number of secondary infections within the community. As in ref. [27], we 
set R0H =2.0 infections within the household and R0C =0.7 infections within the 
community, based on total R0 and how they were observed to distribute within 
household and communities in historical Ebola epidemics [26, 38, 47, 48]. 
 
Transmission rates for homogenous network transmission: In the simplest case of 
homogeneous transmission rates, all members of a household have an equal 
probability of infection from an infectious contact, and all members of the broader 
community have an equal probability of infection from an infectious contact. 
Transmission rates within the household and within the community are normalized so 
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that the reproductive number of household and community infections are always R0H 
and R0C, respectively. Since there are H-1 household contacts within the household of 
a single infectious individual, and (𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻) community contacts within the 
community of a single infectious individual, for a fixed infectious period 1/ λ, 
household and community transmission rates for each infectious-susceptible contact 
are given by: 
𝑡𝐻 ≔
𝑅0𝐻
𝜆 (𝐻−1)
, 𝑡𝐶 ≔
𝑅0𝐶
𝜆 (𝐶∙𝐻−𝐻)
. 
However, as described in refs. [49, 50], for exponentially distributed infectious periods 
1/ λ, household and community transmission rates for each infectious-susceptible 
contact would be: 
𝑡𝐻 ≔
𝑅0𝐻
𝜆 (𝐻−1−𝑅0𝐻)
 , 𝑡𝐶 ≔
𝑅0𝐶
𝜆 (𝐶∙𝐻−𝐻−𝑅0𝐶)
. 
Since there are (𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻) community contacts, the total rate of community 
transmission in the network (for a single infectious individual with all other nodes 
susceptible) would be (𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻) ∙ 𝑡𝐶 . 
 
Transmission rates for distance-dependent network transmission: In ref. [37], we 
introduced distance-dependent transmission so that within the community, the 
transmission rate decreases with the distance between the infectious and susceptible 
individuals. For any distance function f(η), transmission rates on the network may be 
scaled to yield a given set of reproductive numbers R0H and R0C. This is accomplished 
by assigning values α∙f(η) to each community contact and choosing α so that the sum 
of transmission rates (summed along every edge between an individual and every 
other member of the community) is equal to (𝐶𝐻 − 𝐻) ∙ 𝑡𝐶 . Initial transmission rates 
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when all contacts are susceptible are R0H infections per household and R0C infections 
within the community. As the number of exposed nodes accumulate, actual 
transmission rates decrease due to saturation effects that depend on the radial profile 
of the transmission function. Thus, the spread of an infection depends on this 
transmission profile, as well as the household and community reproductive numbers 
and the network structure itself. 
 
Here we consider relatively simple distance-dependent transmission profiles in which 
transmission rates decrease exponentially with distance using the function 𝑓(𝜂) =
𝑒−𝑘𝜂 that we used in ref. [37] or inversely with distance using the function 𝑔(𝜂) =
1
𝜂𝑘
 
(the intuitive “gravity model” from transportation theory [51, 52] , applied to the case 
of households of equal size as we have here). The normalized transmission profiles are 
shown in Figure 3. Other transmission functions that depend on distance may be more 
complex exponential forms (e.g. beta-pert distributed as in ref. [53]). 
 
Community and Ring Vaccination 
We model two types of vaccination. Ring vaccination is the vaccination of household 
members and other close contacts that are members of the community within a radius 
rVR. Community vaccination is the vaccination of members of the entire community. 
Both types of vaccination occur on a daily basis, for flexible start and end times. 
 
Ring vaccination: On the day D that an infectious individual within an accessible 
household becomes infectious, the infectious individual provides a list of their close 
contacts (household members and members of the community within radius rVR). Ring 
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vaccination occurs after delay of τ days so that vaccination occurs on D+τ, with a value 
that ranges from 𝜏 = 4 to 𝜏 = 9 days [54]. A baseline delay of 𝜏 = 6 days is consistent 
with an estimate of 6 days (IQR: 4–9 days) for the median time-from symptom onset to 
effective isolation based on field data of the ongoing outbreak in DRC [54]. For 
reference, in prior outbreaks this delay has been shorter and estimated at 2 days  
based on data from the Guinea ring vaccination trial [43]. Ring vaccination begins on a 
number of days Vstart after a simulation begins with one infectious case. If ring 
vaccination has begun by day D, then members added to contact lists on day D are 
vaccinated on day D+τ (their state changes from S to SVR) if they are susceptible, not 
yet vaccinated, and located within an accessible household.  The radius rVR =5 
households was chosen based on the household size of H=5, in agreement with the 
average household size in the Democratic Republic of Congo [55], to include 55 
individuals. This was based on the identification of 50 contacts per infectious case 
during the Guinea ring vaccination trial [16]. In sensitivity analyses, we explored two 
additional values for the radius of ring vaccination (3 and 7 households). 
 
Community vaccination: If community vaccination is occurring on a given day D, all 
community contacts of infectious individuals will be vaccinated with rate λvc if they are 
susceptible, not yet vaccinated, and located within accessible households. Vaccination 
rates of 5% and 10% per day were studied, corresponding to a program in which on 
average accessible members of the community are vaccinated in 20 or 10 days. 
We do not model exponentially distributed immunity rates. Rather, immunization 
occurs for individuals with state SVR after 10 days and for individuals with state Svc 
after 28 days. It is possible that an individual is vaccinated with community vaccination 
16 
 
and then discovers they are a close contact of an infectious individual, where ring 
vaccination is indicated. Because of this, a spike may occur when community 
vaccination is initiated, due to the comparable delay of protection for these 
individuals. We optimistically model that the individual can be ring vaccinated as well, 
either with a supplemental or additional vaccine dose, will be immunized by whichever 
vaccine would mature first. 
This implementation of community vaccination roughly corresponds to the third ring 
vaccination strategy because it involves the vaccination of relatively close contacts that 
are in the community but outside the radius rVR of closest households. In our network 
model all community members of a household have some probability of contact. While 
the distance dependent transmission rates through the community would permit an 
objective definition of “first”, “second” and “third” level contacts, we do not do that 
here. Instead, we partition the community into the household, the ring that receives 
the highest dose, and the remaining members of the community receiving the lower 
dose. According to a WHO graphic [25], first and second level vaccination involves the 
vaccination of 90 to 110 contacts with the higher dose vaccine and third level 
vaccination involves the vaccination of an additional 50 to 110 contacts at the lower 
level dose. For order of magnitude comparison, our ring vaccination involves the 
vaccination of 55 contacts with the higher dose and the vaccination of 350 people at 
the lower dose. Of note, in our network model, the community size is approximately 
twice as large in membership as the sum of the first, second and third rings 
summarized in the WHO graphic.  However, a larger community size was required by 
our fitting of the epidemiological data (see below)).  
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Simulation Description, and Fitting of the Community Size C 
For a typical simulation, the simulation is initiated on Day 1 with a single infectious 
individual centered within a single community. With each newly exposed individual, 
the contact network is dynamically extended to include the community of every 
exposed individual. As the simulation is run, disease and vaccination states accumulate 
in the network and the algorithm keeps track of the state of each node for each day. 
Disease and/or vaccination states progress as a linear wave through the contact 
network. Outbreaks die out spontaneously when all members of the contact network 
are susceptible, refractory or immune.  
The average growth of an epidemic per day is computed as the average number of 
cases versus day for 500 simulations. The average number of cases for the nth day is 
averaged only for the number of simulations that have not yet extinguished by day n.  
While R0H and R0C are parameters that we consider intrinsic to the virology of Ebola, 
the community size C is an abstract quantity that is meant to capture the net effect of 
community interactions that describe the accumulation of saturation effects. In ref. 
[26], we found that different community sizes would result in different steady state 
levels for the number of cases per day, so that regions with a larger growth rate have a 
larger community size. The community size C must also be calibrated for each 
transmission profile. We choose the community size for each transmission profile by 
assuming that an outbreak in North Kivu would be similar in size to the 2014-16 Ebola 
outbreak in Liberia, if the outbreak was not curbed by vaccination. The community size 
and the transmission profile were also constrained by requiring that ring vaccination 
would be effective with 100% accessibility, since ring vaccination was highly effective 
in the capital [18].  Effective ring vaccination requires a steeper rather than flatter 
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transmission profile. For such transmission profiles, a community size of C=401 was on 
the lower range of community sized that would have a vaccination-free incidence as 
high as that observed in Liberia (which had the highest sustained incidence rate of the 
three countries involved in the West Africa Ebola epidemic).  
 
Model Limitations 
We have made several simplifying assumptions. We assume that the delay to 
vaccination for accessible individuals is a fixed rather than variable time period that 
includes the time to identify the case of Ebola and any other delays to vaccination. The 
time period for the vaccination delay begins the day the individual transitions from 
exposed to infectious.  We assumed that already exposed individuals could not benefit 
from vaccination before becoming infectious. However, there is evidence that 
vaccination after exposure can reduce Ebola symptoms and would likely decrease 
transmission of the infectious individual and for this reason in ref. [43] researchers 
estimated a slighter lower time to immunization of 7 rather than 10 days for the 0.5 ml 
ring vaccine dose. We assumed that the vaccines are 100% effective, and that they are 
effective after a fixed rather than random time interval. Evidence indicates that the 
vaccine efficacy is close to 100% [16]. By assuming a 100% vaccine effectiveness, we 
assume that the effects of non-participation in vaccination or unvaccinated community 
contacts are a much larger effect than a small percentage of vaccine failures.  
There are many unknowns regarding the parametrization of the household community 
structure. We chose a community size that would match the incidence observed in 
Liberia during the West African Ebola epidemic, in the absence of vaccination, but this 
community size depends on the transmission profile as a function of distance that is 
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unknown. The community size and the transmission profile together should be 
interpreted as a summary of complex network interactions that result in an observed 
incidence and are not constrained by the currently available data.  
One of the most significant limitations of our model is that we model a random 
distribution of inaccessible households (also as in ref. [43]), whereas they are likely to 
be clustered within communities. A simplifying assumption we have made is that there 
are only two types of households, “accessible” and “inaccessible”, so that we assume 
that individuals that do not provide contact lists, for whatever reason, are also 
individuals that do not participate in vaccination, for whatever reason. However, if we 
separated such groups, we would have very little data to decide how these groups 
would overlap. We assume that accessibility status is assigned at the household level, 
rather than at the individual or community level, and is the same for either community 
vaccination or ring vaccination. Whereas certainly individuals in a household may hold 
different attitudes and different levels of geographic accessibility, and individual 
behaviors may be different depending on whether contact tracing and vaccination 
teams are visiting in the household or located in the community, it seems a reasonable 
first approximation that all the outcomes will cluster at the household levels. As 
mentioned above, there is likely clustering at the community level as well, and in 
principle, there should be non-random assignment of accessibility for households 
within communities. Vaccination data from the MOH situation reports have suggested 
higher rates of vaccination in certain health zones, which suggests heterogeneous 
inaccessibility  [56]. Likewise, violence targeting healthcare workers has been 
concentrated in certain zones. However, we again do not have the data to specify this 
clustering and have committed to a random distribution.  An obviating consideration is 
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that our modeling results should be interpreted as predictions applied to a relatively 
small geographic region, for subpopulations of approximately 5000 households over 18 
months. If clustering occurs at larger scales (e.g., such as at the health zone level) our 
results apply to subpopulations that might have a relatively low or relatively high 
accessibility, but homogenously, within that subpopulation. 
Distance-dependent transmission rates are meant to account for the net effect of all 
routes of transmission, including, for example, nosocomial and funeral transmission. 
We have not modeled these transmission rates (nor the network compartments) 
separately, which would be required for modeling the effect of time-dependent 
improvements of common interventions on transmission rates.  
Finally, we simulate epidemics in the context of community transmission in the 
absence of any long-range links, so we cannot capture the effects of missed contacts 
that seed outbreaks in new locations (and the initial faster growth of those outbreaks 
in naïve communities). In our simplified network model, households do not necessarily 
map to family residences, but instead households and highly distance-dependent 
transmission rates between nearby households should include a variety of close 
contact structures such as multi-generational households, health centers, school and 
work networks. The linearity of the household-community structures provides a 
conveniently simplified network model but is highly unrealistic in terms of real human 
contact networks. 
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Table 1. Parameter values used in simulations. Description of each model parameter, 
the value or range that is used, and the reference source for the value that is used if 
applicable. 
 
Parameter Description Parameter Value (Range) Source 
H Household Size 5 [26, 27] and [37] 
C Community Size 401 ─  
Β 
Fraction of households 
that are inaccessible. 
0.0-0.6 ─ 
R0H 
Household reproductive 
number 
2.0 [27] 
R0C 
Community 
reproductive number 
0.7 [27] 
1/γ 
Average incubation 
period 
9 days [42] 
1/λ 
Average infectious 
period 
5.6 days [39, 47] 
rVR 
Radius of ring 
vaccination (number of 
households) 
5 (3, 7) [16] 
λVC 
Rate of community 
vaccination 
0.05, 0.1 ─ 
𝜏 
Days to vaccinate an 
individual with the ring 
vaccination program 
6 (4, 9) 
[43, 54] 
 
dVR 
Days till immunity for 
0.5 ml vaccine 
10 [20, 22] 
dVC 
Days till immunity for 
0.2 ml vaccine 
28 [20, 22] 
Vstartr 
Start of the ring 
vaccination campaign 
0-9 months  
Vstartc 
Start of the community 
vaccination campaign 
0-9 months  
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Results 
 
Incidence and extinction with no vaccine interventions 
In the absence of vaccination, our calibrated model predicts that case incidence grows 
during the first 10 serial intervals and then surviving epidemic realizations reach a 
stable case incidence around 40-43 cases per day (Figure 4). A significant fraction of 
epidemic realizations dies out; about 22-30% of the epidemic realizations 
spontaneously extinguish early on, within the first 30 days of the simulation (Figure 4). 
Once epidemic realizations have persisted several serial intervals, they become robust 
to extinction with a very low extinction rate. 
 
Incidence and extinction with ring vaccination 
Our results indicate that the impact of a ring vaccination strategy depends on the 
fraction of inaccessible households. Using our baseline parameter values (Table 1), in 
the best-case scenario when all households are accessible (β=0), the probability of 
epidemic control increases over time with a ring vaccination strategy that starts 30 
days after epidemic onset (Figure 5). Since epidemic realizations are likely to end 
spontaneously within the first 30 days, the effect of ring vaccination applied after 30 
days shows the effect of ring vaccination on the fraction of remaining epidemics that 
would otherwise likely persist. Data from the curves in Figure 5 showing this increase 
in the probability of epidemic extinction over time are summarized in Figure 6.  Over 
12 and 18 months, the supplemental probability of epidemic containment with no 
further cases of Ebola with ring vaccination for a fully accessible population is 22-32% 
and 33-44%, respectively.  At a 10% level of household inaccessibility, the probability 
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of epidemic control decreases relative to the case of full accessibility (curves in Figure 
5, Panel A) but the probability that the epidemic is contained with no further cases of 
Ebola still slowly accumulates over time. At higher (>10%) levels of household 
inaccessibility, the pattern is qualitatively different. The probability of epidemic control 
no longer increases with the application of ring vaccination and rapidly saturates 
around 19-30%, just as it would without the application of ring vaccination. However, 
the trajectory of outbreak incidence conditional on non-extinction stabilizes around 8-
22 cases per day, which is markedly lower than the case of no ring vaccination (Figure 
5).   
 
These results for vaccination applied at 30 days show that for even low fractions of 
inaccessible households and a significant delay to vaccinating individuals (𝜏 = 6 days), 
ring vaccination has little effect on ending an epidemic but substantially decreases the 
size of the epidemic. This pattern is robust to the timing of start of the ring vaccination 
program: when ring vaccination is applied to an established epidemic wave after 9 
months, there is no effect on the lifetime of the epidemic if the fraction of accessible 
households is ≥20%, but the steady state incidence decreases (Figure 7). Ring 
vaccination applied after 9 months decreases steady state incidence to the same 
values as ring vaccination applied earlier, after 30 days (Figure 5). 
 
Results from sensitivity analyses indicate that increasing the radius of ring vaccination 
from 5 households to 7 significantly enhances the probability of epidemic control when 
levels of household inaccessibility are below 20% (Figure 6).  However, decreasing the 
delay to vaccinating contacts from 6 to 4 days only increases the probability of 
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epidemic control by about 10% for the best case scenario when all households are 
accessible (Figure 6), but it does not influence the probability of epidemic control even 
for low levels of household inaccessibility (as low as 10%). 
 
 
Community vaccination that supplements a ring vaccination strategy can significantly 
increase the probability of epidemic control.  
 
For the scenario resembling the DRC Ebola epidemic where a ring vaccination strategy 
starts one week after epidemic onset and is subsequently supplemented with 
community vaccination 9 months later, we found that the community vaccination 
strategy substantially increases the probability of extinction, after a delay, and can 
substantially decrease the endemic state (Figure 8). However, the probability of 
achieving epidemic containment again appears to not be improved when the fraction 
of inaccessible household is too high (e.g., 50% inaccessible; Figure 8). Figure 9 
illustrates the effects of the community vaccination rates on case incidence and the 
probability of epidemic control.  The supplemental effect of community vaccination on 
the probability of epidemic extinction for populations with different levels of 
inaccessible households ranging from 0 to 50% are summarized in Figure 10.  After 1.5 
years of disease transmission, our model-based results indicate that the probability of 
epidemic control is at 60-71% for a 30% level of household inaccessibility and 30-41% 
for a 40% household inaccessibility level based on a community vaccination rate of 
10% per day. 
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As shown in Figures 9 and 10, supplemental community vaccination has a substantial 
effect on decreasing the daily incidence of cases and increasing the rate of extinction. 
While community vaccination has a near-immediate effect on decreasing case 
incidence, the effect of community vaccination on the rate of extinction occurs with a 
delay, from 3 months to as long as a year, that varies with the fraction of accessible 
households and the daily rate of immunization (Figures 9 and 10). For the longest delay 
of one year for the case of 40% inaccessible households, the increase in the rate of 
extinction is striking for showing an abrupt rise after such a long delay. For all 
conditions evaluated in Figures 9 and 10, the rate of extinction becomes non-negligible 
and the probability of extinction begins increasing only when the case incidence drops 
to a small number of cases (2-4 cases). This provides an explanation for the year-long 
delay observed for the case of 40% inaccessible households : the daily incidence drops 
at a slower rate so that it takes a year for the incidence to fall to a sufficiently low level 
of cases.  For populations where the fraction of inaccessible households is higher and 
the probability of containment does not increase at all; the daily incidence decreases 
but never decreases to such low levels before reaching a steady state number of cases. 
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Discussion 
 
In this paper we have employed an individual-level stochastic transmission model to 
evaluate ring and community vaccination strategies for containing Ebola epidemics in 
the context of varying levels of community accessibility to public health interventions. 
Our individual-based model, which was calibrated based on the transmission dynamics 
of the 2014-16 Western African Ebola epidemic in the absence of vaccination, 
incorporates four sources of heterogeneity including a proportion of the population 
that is inaccessible for effective contact tracing and vaccination efforts, two levels of 
population mixing resembling household and community transmission, two types of 
vaccine doses with different time periods until immunity,  and spatial dependence on 
transmission rates. Our findings indicate that ring vaccination, which targets a radius of 
contacts for each infectious individual, is an effective intervention to contain Ebola 
epidemics at low levels of household inaccessibility (<10%) in the presence of 
significant delays to vaccinating contacts. At higher levels of household inaccessibility, 
ring vaccination could be useful for reducing the disease endemicity level, but it is no 
longer an effective intervention to ensure outbreak containment in the absence of any 
other interventions. This is in agreement with other modeling results that ring 
vaccination may not be sufficient for containing outbreaks with higher reproductive 
numbers (15), in the range we have here, and when a fraction of individuals in the 
transmission chain are missed and do not participate in ring vaccination (39).  
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In this study, our model was designed to evaluate the impact of an intermediate-scale 
“3rd ring” level of community vaccination and the effect of variable delays to 
vaccination and variable levels of community participation, especially in the context of 
two vaccine doses that would require different times to achieve immunity. Our 
household-community network model is especially suited for an intermediate scale 
level of vaccination since communities are a network unit in our model centered at 
each household. For adjacent households, communities modulate by the inclusion and 
exclusion of one household at a time as the communities linearly arrange through the 
network. Note that this network definition of minutely modulating, overlapping 
communities, while natural for defining a 3rd level of contacts, is different from that of 
the usual notion of communities that divide a population into relatively disjoint 
groups, with some fraction of network connections between them. 
 
We found that community vaccination strategies that supplement a ring vaccination 
strategy can speed up and enhance the probability of epidemic containment. The 
substantial impact of the community vaccination (figure 8-10) shows that the longer 
interval to immunity of the lower vaccine dose does not harm containment efforts; 
that is, in our simulations the vaccination wave moves ahead of the outbreak wave 
even with the longer time period to immunity involved. There are two careful caveats 
with this. First, community vaccination with the lower vaccine dose has a substantial 
impact compared to no dose (that is, no community vaccination).  We modeled 
community vaccination for the case of a 0.2 ml vaccine dose.  
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Second, a small number of individuals who have been tagged for community 
vaccination and have taken the lower dose vaccine will discover within 18 days (the 
difference between 28 days and 10 days) that they are within the ring of an infected 
individual. We modeled that the individual would take the higher dose vaccine (or a 
booster) vaccine since it would be important to provide the faster protection. In 
simulations where we did not do this, there was an initial spike in cases the first couple 
weeks that community vaccination was implemented, until community vaccination had 
time to reduce the incidence.  
 While community vaccination decreases transmission and increases the probability of 
the outbreak extinguishing, reliable containment of the epidemic still occurs only for 
moderate levels of household inaccessibility (e.g., <50%).  For instance, our results for 
the scenario motivated by the DRC Ebola epidemic predict a low but steady probability 
of epidemic containment of about 5% per month for a 30% household inaccessibility 
level (Figure 9). More generally, our results highlight the critical need to enhance 
community engagement to public health interventions while offering a safe and secure 
environment to the population in order to increase the effectiveness of control 
interventions to ensure outbreak containment. 
 
Active local conflict and lack of community trust of the government and public health 
authorities hamper containment of epidemics driven by person-to-person transmission 
[9]. In this context, efforts to increase community engagement could enhance the 
effectiveness of contact tracing activities and vaccination acceptance rates. 
[7]. Findings from a recent survey in DRC indicate  that low institutional trust is 
associated with a decreased likelihood of adopting preventative behaviors, including 
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seeking formal health services at hospitals or health centres [9]. Importantly, there is 
some evidence that Ebola outbreak in DRC is being perceived in the region as a 
political tool against certain groups while some other groups benefit politically and 
financially from the ongoing epidemic [57]. This underscores the need to ensure an 
objective Ebola response that is entirely isolated from political biases. Indeed, prior 
work suggests that the implementation of integrative communal approaches can help 
improve epidemiological surveillance and enhance the adoption of Ebola preventive 
measures [7, 59-61]. 
In contrast to the simple SIR compartmental transmission models based on  
homogenous mixing assumptions that support bell-shaped epidemic trajectories [62, 
63] [64, 65], our spatially structured stochastic model employed in this study has been 
able to successfully capture stationary disease waves where the virus moves through 
the host population over time. This transmission pattern is qualitatively similar to 
those of the ongoing Ebola epidemic in DRC [66, 67]. In particular, they achieve 
relatively steady incidence levels as Ebola spreads from one community to another, 
and the total incidence can be interpreted as the super-positioning of the cases from a 
discrete number of communities involved rather than explosive exponential growth. 
However, our model does not predict sporadic increases in case incidence, as in the 
most recent surge in case incidence [68], which is not surprising as our model does not 
incorporate time-dependent changes in the effectiveness of control interventions tied 
to violent attacks to healthcare workers and public health infrastructure. From an 
epidemic modeling perspective, our results underscore the need to capture an 
appropriate spatial structure in models of disease transmission [26, 31-33, 69, 70]. 
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Such considerations may be more important for infectious diseases that are 
transmitted via close contact such as Ebola and HIV. 
 
In summary, we found that the role of vaccination strategies in containing Ebola 
epidemics significantly depends on the level of community inaccessibility using an 
individual-level stochastic transmission model that successfully captures stationary 
disease waves that are qualitatively similar to those of the ongoing Ebola epidemic in 
DRC. For lower levels of inaccessibility, the probability of containment increases over 
time. For higher levels, vaccination strategies investigated in this study are not 
expected to contain the epidemic, but they help reduce incidence levels, which saves 
lives, makes the epidemic easier to contain and reduces spread to other communities. 
This qualitative change occurs for both types of vaccination strategies: ring vaccination 
is effective for containing an outbreak until the level of inaccessibility exceeds 
approximately 10%, a combined ring and community vaccination strategy is effective 
until the level of inaccessibility exceeds approximately 50%. In order to enhance the 
effectiveness of control interventions, it is crucial to ensure community engagement to 
public health interventions. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. The seven epidemiological states for individuals in the population and the 
transitions between states. Susceptible (S) and individuals vaccinated with either the 
ring or community dose of vaccine (Svr, SVc) may become exposed (E). Once exposed, 
individuals eventually become infectious and then refractory. Vaccinated individuals 
that do not become exposed eventually become immunized (M). 
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Figure 2. Description of the contact network. A) The contact network is initialized with 
a single infectious individual (red node) and that individual’s community. For this 
illustrative schematic, the household size H=5 and the community size is small with 
C=25. The accessibility (white nodes) or inaccessibility (gray nodes) of a household is 
assigned randomly during the construction of the contact network. The index case 
happens to be in an inaccessible household: the first case of the simulation does not 
supply a contact list, and no contacts are vaccinated. B) After several timesteps, the 
infectious index case exposes another member of their household (blue node in the 
hith household) and a member of their community (blue node at a distance of 8 
households). When the community member is exposed in the hi+8th household, the 
total contact network is extended by 8 households to include their community (the 
hi+8th  community is outlined with a black rectangle). C) The hi+8th household is 
accessible, so once the exposed individual becomes infectious a contact list is provided 
(green nodes) of households within a radius Rv=2. One household within this radius is 
excluded since it is inaccessible. The members of this household are not included on 
contact lists, do not participate in vaccination, and/or are not geographically accessible 
to the vaccination teams, etc. 
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Figure 3: Community transmission profiles and steady states in the absence of 
vaccination. A) Transmission rates as a function of distance from an infectious 
individual for an inverse transmission profile (left) and exponential transmission profile 
(right) with community reproductive number R0C=0.7 for both profiles. The inverse 
distance function is 𝑔(𝜂) =
1
𝜂0.93
 and the exponential distance function is 𝑓(𝜂) =
𝑒−0.02𝜂 for the community size C=401. B). For this community size and transmission 
profile parameters, a steady state incidence comparable to that of the 2014-16 Ebola 
epidemic in Liberia is achieved when simulating epidemics in the absence of 
vaccination (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Probability of epidemic extinction and the baseline mean daily incidence 
curves in the absence of interventions for the exponential and gravity transmission 
profiles that define transmission rates as a function of the distance from an infectious 
individual (see also Figure 3). For each transmission profile, the model was calibrated 
by choosing the community size for each transmission profile by assuming that the 
ongoing Ebola outbreak in North Kivu would be similar in size to the 2014-16 Ebola 
outbreak in Liberia in the absence of vaccination. Outbreaks propagate through the 
population as spatial waves with an endemic state. The average number of cases for 
the nth day is averaged only for the number of simulations that have not yet 
extinguished by day n. The error bars show the 95% confidence intervals for the mean 
daily incidence. 
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Figure 5.  The impact of ring vaccination that starts 30 days after epidemic onset on 
the probability of outbreak extinction and the mean daily incidence curves for various 
percentage levels of inaccessible households, which do not participate in vaccination 
and do not provide contacts lists as explained in the text. These simulations were 
generated using the exponential transmission profile, but similar results were obtained 
using the gravity transmission profile described in the main text. The vertical dashed 
line indicates the timing of start of the ring vaccination program. 
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Figure 6. The probability of epidemic control for a ring vaccination strategy as a 
function of the radius of the ring and the delay to vaccinating contacts. The baseline 
parameter value for the radius of ring vaccination is the intermediate value of RVR=5, 
and the baseline parameter value for the delay to vaccination is the intermediate value 
of τ=6 days. Baseline parameter values for other parameters not varied in this figure 
are given in Table 1. 
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Figure 7. The impact of ring vaccination on an established epidemic wave (after a delay 
of 270 days) on the probability of outbreak extinction and the mean daily incidence 
curves for various percentage levels of household inaccessibility. These simulations 
were generated using the exponential transmission profile, but similar results were 
obtained using the gravity transmission profile described in the main text. The vertical 
dashed line indicates the timing of start of the ring vaccination program.  
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Figure 8. Mean daily case incidence when a community vaccination rate of 10% per 
day supplements a ring vaccination strategy 9 months later for different levels of 
household inaccessibility. The vertical dashed line indicates the timing of start of the 
supplemental community vaccination efforts.  These simulations were generated using 
the exponential transmission profile, but similar results were obtained using the 
gravity transmission profile described in the main text. 
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Figure 9. Probability of epidemic extinction over time and the mean daily case 
incidence when different community vaccination rates supplement a ring vaccination 
strategy for a 30% level of household inaccessibility and community vaccination starts 
9 months after epidemic onset. The vertical dashed line indicates the timing of start of 
community vaccination.  These simulations were generated using the exponential 
transmission profile, but similar results were obtained using the gravity transmission 
profile described in the main text. 
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Figure 10.  Supplemental effect on community vaccination on the probability of 
epidemic extinction for populations with different household inaccessibility levels 
ranging from 0 to 50%. Bars show the probability of epidemic extinction after 1.5 years 
for increasing vaccination measures: i) ring vaccination alone (blue bars), ii) ring 
vaccination with  supplemental community vaccination with a rate of 5% community 
vaccination per day (light blue bars) and iii) ring vaccination with  supplemental 
community vaccination with a rate of 10% vaccination per day. The horizontal line 
indicates the mean probability of extinction for the baseline scenario in the absence of 
vaccination. Timing was chosen to resemble the scenario for the DRC Ebola epidemic, 
with ring vaccination applied after 7 days and community vaccination applied after 9 
months. These simulations were generated using the exponential transmission profile, 
but qualitatively similar results were obtained using the gravity transmission profile 
described in the main text. 
 
 
 
 
 
